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1. EU law and the reception of international decisions 
Today, it has become trite to note that the EU interacts more and more with, and 
participates in an increasing number of international institutions, bodies and networks 
operating in the global scene. Legally, the terms in which EU law interacts with 
international law have been defined mostly by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union while interpreting and giving effect to the EU Treaties. Having secured the 
autonomy of the EU legal order, the Court of Justice has equally defined a set of 
principles and legal rules that generally ensure a rather open stance of the EU to 
international law, both regarding its own duties and those of the Member States.2 
However, the broad boundaries defined by the Court are, in part, challenged by the 
EU’s expanding role in the international scene as well as by the transformations of 
international society itself and of international law.3 This essay shows that in between 
                                                                
1Assistant Professor, University of Amsterdam; Researcher, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance 
(ACELG). A first version of this essay was presented at the Conference “Global Governance as Public Authority: 
Structures, Contestation, and Normative Change” held at the Hertie School of Governance (Berlin), in April 2011 and 
will be published in the Working Paper Series of the University of Amsterdam. The author gratefully acknowledges the 
comments on previous drafts of Nico Krisch, Michael Zürn, Pieter-Jan Kuijper, Harm Schepel, Jean d’Aspremont and 
her colleagues in the research group “The Architecture of Postnational Rulemaking”, in particular Ingo Venzke and 
Yannick Radi, as well as the useful discussions with Marc Pallemaerts on the practice of EU external relations. 
2 Case 181/73, Haegeman v Belgium 1974 E.C.R. 449, paragraph 5; Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg, 
1981 E.C.R. 3641, paragraphs 13, 14 and 17; Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap 
voor Groeten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, paragraphs 14 to 18, and 20; Case C-61/94, Commission v Germany, 1996 
E.C.R. I-3989, paragraph 52. See also Opinion 1/91, of 14 December 1991, E.C.R. I-6079, paragraphs 35 and 71; 
Opinion 1/00, of 18 April 2002 E.C.R. I-3493, paragraph 12. 
3 See respectively, e.g., Marise Cremona, External Relations and External Competence of the European Union: The Emergence of 
an Integrated Policy in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW (Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca eds, Oxford University Press, 
 2 
openness and autonomy, the EU rules of reception of international law do not capture 
the complexity of the interconnections between different regulatory regimes developed at 
the global and at the EU level, nor the challenges currently posed by rule-making in the 
global scene. Increasingly, rule-making by an ever-wider number of international bodies, 
networks, other public and private actors is detached from state consent and has direct 
relevance and impact on the rights and interests of individuals. This phenomenon has 
been analyzed as yet another form of exercise of public authority, and considered in 
many ways parallel to the exercise of public authority by national administrations.4 If one 
applies public law concepts and tools developed within liberal democratic traditions to 
the global scene, the exercise of public authority, whichever its manifestation, ought to 
be restrained by procedural and substantive standards that satisfy expectations of 
legitimacy and ensure the protection of private legal spheres confronted therewith.5 Such 
challenges posed by the exercise of public authority by international institutions, bodies 
and networks, both in formal and informal settings, are largely ignored by the EU rules 
of reception of international law. Such concerns simply fall outside their scope and 
rationale. At the same time, the EU retains a “middle ground” position between 
international and national law. By incorporating acts adopted at the international level, it 
fundamentally transforms their status vis-à-vis national laws. International acts 
incorporated in EU law partake the effects of EU law in national legal orders.6 EU law 
thereby contributes to exacerbating the effects of the exercise of public authority at the 
international or global level vis-à-vis individuals. While this article addresses only the 
interaction between global regulatory regimes and EU law, and not the effects this may 
have in national legal orders, these further effects arguably strengthen the need to assess 
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the limits of the EU rules of reception, which have so far been largely ignored. Unveiling 
such limits, and specifically the effects that the reception of international decisions may 
have on procedural standards practiced in EU law, is the main purpose of this article. 
This essay focuses on the reception in EU law of decisions adopted within global 
regulatory regimes by international institutions, bodies and networks, whether established 
by an international treaty or not. “Global regulatory regimes” refers to functional issue-
specific regimes created and regulated beyond the state, outside projects of regional 
integration, including both public, private and hybrid regimes the effects of which 
potentially concern different regions of the world.7 The term “decisions” is used here in a 
broad sense, to refer to normative instruments with general regulatory effects external to 
the organization or institutional structure within which they were adopted, such as 
decisions of Conferences of Parties, guidelines, standards, recommendations, that do not 
have a judicial or quasi-judicial adjudicatory function. It encompasses informal acts that 
may result from informal coordination in regulatory networks involving public and 
private actors at the global level, which may be considered as functionally equivalent to 
the exercise of public authority.8 “Decisions” is therefore one possible way of designating 
in general terms acts of diverse nature adopted by international organizations or bodies. 
As mentioned, it is one specific aspect of reception of international decisions that 
is analyzed here: its effects on procedural standards. Procedural standards have the 
double function of structuring the exercise of public authority and protecting the legal 
sphere of those possibly affected by the ensuing decisions.9 Access to information, 
participation and the giving of reasons typically ensure the procedural protection of those 
affected by adjudicatory decisions. In general, rules on transparency, participation and 
accountability constitute procedural constraints that lend legitimacy to public actions, by 
detaching – albeit not fully – decision-making from the preferences of the decision-
maker. They may also serve purposes of subjective protection – similar to the guarantees 
                                                                
7 Pleading for an accurate used of “global”, see William Twining, A Post-Westphalian conception of law in 37 LAW AND 
SOCIETY REVIEW 199 (2003), 244. 
8 Joost Pauwelyn, “Informal International Lawmaking: Mapping the Action and Testing the Concepts of 
Accountability and Effectiveness”, Project Framing Paper (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1738464, accessed February 23, 2012); on functional 
equivalence, see Bogdandy and others (n. 4 above), 14. 
9 The term “standards” is preferred to “guarantees”, “rights” or “rules”. “Standards” is a boarder term that refers to 
benchmarks of proper procedural conduct by decision-makers. It includes both procedural rights compliance with 
which is imposed by legal rules, and rules of procedural conduct that stem from established governance practices. 
Normatively, however, it is submitted that only if legally mediated can they control the exercise of public authority and 
constitute “guarantees” proper.  
 4 
usually envisaged in adjudicatory procedures – when rule-making impacts on individuals’ 
legal spheres in an analogous way to adjudicatory decisions.  
This article shows that the incorporation of such decisions of international 
organizations or bodies in the EU legal order may lead to contrasting results. More often 
than not, it may weaken or bypass procedural standards that would otherwise apply or be 
justified as constraints to the exercise of EU public authority. Arguably, such procedural 
standards are less frequently followed in decision-making procedures of global regulatory 
regimes and denied in EU rule-making that transposes international decisions. Weaker or 
no procedural standards followed in the segments of EU law that result from the 
reception of international decisions unleash the exercise of public authority and weaken 
its procedural legitimacy. Indeed, such standards have become accepted in EU law and 
governance as yardsticks against which to measure the legitimacy of public authority The 
problems posed by the depletion of procedural standards are aggravated in cases where 
the very way in which decisions adopted by international organizations or bodies are 
received in EU law bypasses the general rules of reception established by the Court of 
Justice, since these establish the conditions under which such decisions may legitimately 
produce effects in the EU legal system. 
The article will begin by outlining and analyzing the formal rules of reception of 
decisions of international organizations or bodies in the EU legal order (Section 2). 
These rules define the systemic entry points of such decisions in EU law, i.e. those that 
are expressly envisaged by the EU legal system and thereby filter reception as to ensure 
coherence with EU law and, specifically, with its institutional rules. Mostly, they reflect 
the openness of the EU legal system towards international law. At the same time, the 
reception of decisions of international organizations or bodies is also subject to the 
general boundaries that were established by the Court of Justice with a view to protecting 
the autonomy of EU law. Next, on the basis of illustrative cases, this essay will move on 
to present the limits of the current formal rules of reception regarding procedural 
standards. This analysis will highlight two types of limits. First, the general rules leave 
issues of procedural legitimacy in the hands of the system of origin, which may not have 
procedural rules as developed as the ones in force in the EU (Section 3). Second, a-
systemic ways of reception of decisions of international organizations or bodies – i.e. not 
captured in anyway by the general rules of reception and, therefore, in strict terms, not 
formally recognized by the EU legal system – also threaten procedural standards that 
would otherwise apply and, therefore, affect the legitimacy of EU decision-making. 
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Specifically, administrative collaboration between public and private regulatory bodies 
situated at different regulatory levels (global/EU) may lead to bypassing EU procedural 
standards, while the effects of such collaboration may be similar to those stemming from 
decisions of international organizations or bodies (Section 4). Finally, the article will both 
summarize the main conclusions and sketch possible normative paths – constitutional, 
procedural, and theoretical – that could lead to preserving procedural standards at the 
intersection of legal systems, highlighting also their respective hurdles (Section 5). 
2. Defining boundaries 
International agreements concluded by the EU are an integral part of EU law from 
their entry into force.10 According to established case law, decisions of international 
organizations and bodies, if directly connected to an international agreement 
incorporated in EU law, also form an integral part of the EU legal system from their 
entry into force,11 in the same way as the agreement itself.12 This rule has been 
formulated with regard to binding decisions of Association Councils acting under the 
Association Agreements of the EU with third countries and was subsequently developed 
mainly in this same area.13 In the case of Sevince, a Turkish national challenged the refusal 
of the Dutch State Secretary of Justice to grant him a residence permit on the grounds 
that such refusal violated a decision of the Association Council acting under the 
Association Agreement with Turkey. The Court made it clear that the decisions of this 
Council would partake in the same effects of the respective international agreement.14 
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This finding countered previous dualist practices of the EU with regard to decisions of 
international bodies.15  
The Court later explicitly extended the rule formulated in Sevince to decisions of 
other international bodies set up under international agreements concluded by the EU 
with third countries. In Deutsche Shell, the Court assessed the status in the EU legal order 
of a recommendation adopted by a Joint Committee entrusted with the task of 
implementing a multilateral agreement signed by the then EEC, established under that 
agreement. The German authorities had applied the recommendation of the Joint 
Committee, which defined rules concerning the sealing of goods in trade between the 
parties to the Convention, and Shell questioned the validity of such recommendation in 
the EU legal order. The Court relied on Sevince, thereby deciding that non-binding 
decisions required for the application of international agreements that form an integral 
part of the EU legal system are also part of EU law.16  
This bare-bone rule regarding the status of decisions of international organizations 
and bodies in EU law has not been as developed and further substantiated as the general 
principles applicable to international agreements.17 The rulings of the Court of Justice 
laying down the general foundations of the reception of decisions of international bodies 
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in EU law concern mostly the decisions of the Association Council of EEC-Turkey 
Association Agreement. Most other cases pertaining to the reception of international 
decisions in the EU legal order have assessed EU legal acts that transposed international 
decisions, and not the decisions themselves.18 Indeed, this form of reception of decisions 
of international organizations or bodies remains common practice, for example in the 
fields of fisheries and the environment.19 
Despite the limited elaboration in the case law, one may surmise that, given its 
rationale, the rule according to which decisions of international bodies set up under 
international agreements binding on the EU form part of the EU legal system, if directly 
connected to the underlying agreements, is generally applicable, irrespective of how 
decisions of international organizations or bodies are concretely transposed into the EU 
legal order. According to the case law, this rule is grounded on the fact that, ultimately, 
the EU and its contracting parties gave their consent to the emanation of such decisions. 
Indeed, the direct link between the decision and the respective agreement (“unmittelbaren 
Zusammenhang” in the original wording of the Court in Deutsche Shell) stems from the fact 
that the decision emanates from a body established under an agreement concluded by the 
EU, which was entrusted with responsibility for its implementation.20 According to 
Advocate General Van Gerven, relying on previous Court judgments, the fact “that the 
act is placed ‘within the institutional framework’ of the agreement and ‘gives effect to it’” 
(i.e. to its objectives) are crucial factors to determine a “close connection” (“nauwe 
samenhang”) between the agreement and the decision.21 The underlying reason to give 
them a similar status and effect seems to be the fact that, by signing the agreement, the 
EU agreed to entrust powers of decision to organs created by the agreement with the 
purpose of giving effect to the latter.22 In this logic, the binding or non-binding nature of 
the decision is irrelevant to determine whether it is a part of the EU legal order.23 Its 
binding nature only becomes relevant to assess the effects of the decision, not its status. 
This rationale applies to decisions of bodies set up both by bilateral and 
multilateral agreements. This resulted already from the formulation of Sevince, but Deutsche 
Shell dissipated any possible remaining doubts on this issue. However, in the case of 
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19 Idem, pp. 55-7 and 81-4. This is illustrated by the cases analyzed below in Section 3. 
20 Deutsche Shell (n. 16 above), paragraph 17. 
21 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Van Gerven, delivered on 15 October 1992, Case C-188/91, Deutsche Shell AG v 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, 1993 E.C.R. I-363, paragraph 10. 
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decisions of bodies set up by multilateral agreements, the link between the consent of the 
EU and the activity of the international body is weaker. Ultimately, as underlined by 
Gilsdorf, the decision may be adopted against the will of the EU.24 The EU participates 
in the decision-making process in a different position from the one it has in the context 
of bilateral agreements in general and, in particular, in the context of Association 
Councils that implement Association Agreements, where it is virtually “the master of the 
preparation of decisions to be taken”.25 Yet, undoubtedly, the EU by concluding the 
agreement, consented to the procedural rules that it enshrines, including the decision-
making rules applicable to the bodies set up by the agreement, and is therefore bound by 
such decisions. Independently of the possibility of raising objections with a view to 
avoiding undesirable constraining effects, the EU is bound by the principle pacta sunt 
servanda and by the consequences of its consent.26 
At a general level of analysis, the ‘consent rationale’ that, according to the case law 
of the Court of Justice, justifies the effect of decisions adopted by international 
organizations and bodies in the EU legal order does not apply to decisions of 
international organizations and bodies to which the EU is only an observer and not a 
member. In this case, arguably there is no link between the consent of the EU and the 
activity of the international body. Therefore, in principle, the EU is not legally bound by 
the decisions of the international organization and body to which it is merely an 
observer. It may, of course, wish to follow them and carry them out, within the limits of 
its competences, and in accordance with the values that it upholds in the international 
sphere (e.g. the maintenance of international peace and security, environmental 
protection, sustainable development, economic integration). At the same time, there may 
be important nuances to the logic according to which the EU is not bound by the 
decisions of international organizations to which it is not a member. Cases in point are 
those in which the Member States are bound by such decisions, because they are members 
of the international organization from which they stem, but their powers in the matter at 
issue have been transferred to the EU. This may occur, for example, with regard to the 
International Health Regulations issued by the World Health Organization.27 In the 
famous cases of the UN Security Council resolutions on economic sanctions, the issue 
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arose whether the EU, although not being a UN member, would nevertheless be bound 
to pay heed to such resolutions.28 
The rule of Sevince and Deutsche Shell is in line with the openness or ‘friendliness’ of 
the EU legal order with regard to international law.29 This general approach is, however, 
limited by the general principles formulated by the Court of Justice with a view to 
ensuring the autonomy of EU law that currently set the boundaries of the EU legal 
system vis-à-vis international law. On a first step, the Court of Justice shielded the EU 
legal order from international agreements that could negatively impact on the 
institutional balance defined in the Treaties as well as on the relative powers of the EU 
institutions. Thus, it prevented the entering into force of international agreements “likely 
adversely to affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties, and hence, the 
autonomy of the Community legal order” and, thereby, to clash with “the very 
foundations” of the Union.30 The Court of Justice also established that the autonomy of 
EU law required “the essential character of the powers of the Community and its 
institutions as conceived in the Treaty to remain unaltered”.31 More recently, moving 
from issues of institutional balance and preservation of institutional power to substantive 
legal principles, the Court held that “the obligations imposed by an international 
agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC 
Treaty” that form part of “the very foundations of the Community legal order”, among 
which the respect for fundamental rights, including judicial review.32 Irrespective of the 
circumstances of the cases in which they were formulated – and concretely of the fact 
that these rules regarded, respectively, international agreements and the validity of 
Community acts transposing UN Security Council resolutions to EU law – these 
statements of the Court of Justice defined general limits to the reception of international 
law in the EU legal order. As such, they also limit the reception of decisions of 
international organizations and bodies. 
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3. Between openness and autonomy 
In between openness towards international law, on the one hand, and autonomy of 
the EU legal order in its external dimension, on the other, there remain unsolved issues 
of procedural legitimacy that may stem from the relationships between the two legal 
orders. This is one important aspect of the impact of international legal regimes in the 
EU legal order, as more acts that stand at the crossroads of international law and EU law 
shape the conduct of natural and legal persons, defining concrete entitlements and 
obligations.  Their procedural protection may be ensured through rules of constitutional 
nature (e.g. due process in restricting fundamental rights) or through rules of 
administrative procedure (e.g. access to file, participation of interested persons). Both 
types of rules provide standards against which to measure the legitimate exercise of 
public authority. 
The analysis below will show, through illustrative examples, the effects the 
incorporation of decisions of international organizations or bodies in the EU legal order 
may have on guarantees of participation applicable under the general rules of EU law. A 
previous essay has shown that two different factors explain why the interaction between 
global regulatory regimes and the EU legal order may ultimately lead to lower procedural 
standards in the segments of EU law that result from the reception of decisions of 
international organizations or bodies.33 Firstly, procedural standards applicable to the 
making of such decisions may not be as developed as in EU law while the regulatory acts 
are applied in the EU legal order as they have been adopted in international fora. 
Secondly, procedures followed by the EU for the adoption of legal acts of reception may 
not be as demanding in terms of procedural guarantees as they would be for purely 
internal matters.  
This section will take the argument further. It will present one case where 
reception of decisions of international bodies has a negative impact on procedural rules 
valid within EU law – the reception of decisions adopted by the Fisheries Commissions 
of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations – thereby confirming those first 
findings. However, the analysis of the interaction between the regime of the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and EU 
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law will also show that the opposite phenomenon may occur. This is important, as it 
shows that the diversity of global regulatory regimes manifests itself also in this respect. 
The case of CITES is, likely, exceptional in terms of guarantees of participation 
recognized to non-governmental bodies, for the reasons explained below, but it gives an 
interesting contrasting view on the effects of the interaction between EU law and 
international regulatory regimes on procedural standards. 
In both examples, EU law incorporates the decisions of international organizations 
or bodies through non-legislative rulemaking. The decisions of the Fisheries 
Commissions are received in legal acts that, although adopted directly on the basis of the 
Treaty, by the Council on a proposal of the Commission, are not legislative acts under 
the rules of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).34 The 
decisions of the Conference of the Parties of CITES are incorporated in EU law by non-
legislative acts of the Commission that adapt and give effect to EU legislation. It is often 
the case that decisions of international bodies enter the EU legal order at the level of 
non-legislative rulemaking, even though they are also received by legislative acts.35 
 
EU Fisheries Policy: Transparent and participative? 
A cornerstone of the EU Common Fisheries Policy 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) have recently become important actors in the 
management of the EU Common Fisheries Policy. They were introduced in its 2002 
reform with the goal of enabling the participation of interested parties in the decision-
making processes in this policy field. The EU law-making institutions considered that the 
RACs would “enable the Common Fisheries Policy to benefit from the knowledge and 
experience of the fishermen concerned and of other stakeholders and to take into 
account the diverse conditions throughout the Community waters”.36 Disengagement of 
the parties concerned with a policy mostly perceived as being “remote, unresponsive and 
                                                                
34 For examples, see n. 65 below. 
35 E.g. the EU directive on irradiation facilities used for the treatment of foods makes the approval of such facilities by 
Member States dependent on they meeting the requirements of the relevant Codex code of practice (Article 7(2) of 
Directive No 1999/2/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 February 1999 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States concerning foods and food ingredients treated with ionising radiation (O.J. L 6/16, 
13.3.1999). 
36 Recital 27 of preamble of Council Regulation No 2371/2002, of 20 December 2002, on the conservation and 
sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy (O.J. L 358/59, 31.12.2002), as 
amended (henceforth, “Basic Regulation”).  
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bureaucratic”37 and lack of adaptation to the regional circumstances, were some of the 
“traditional failings” of the Common Fisheries Policy.38 The RACs were intended to 
correct these failings, thereby contributing to the achievement of the goals of the 
Common Fisheries Policy.39 They became, therefore, a central aspect of the 2002 
reform.40  
Despite partially dependent on EU funding, the RACs are “stakeholder-led 
bodies”.41 The Commission does not directly establish them, but rather endorses them, 
in contrast to other consultative structures active in the Common Fisheries Policy.42 One 
may claim that this strengthens their legitimacy,43 although, admittedly this is not a 
sufficient condition thereof. The majority of their members are representatives of the 
fisheries sector, although the Commission has recently proposed to replace the current 
distribution of membership (two thirds for the fisheries sector) with the requirement of a 
“balanced representation of all stakeholders”.44 The RACs advise mainly the Commission 
on matters of fisheries management falling within their respective jurisdiction.45 
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21st Report of Session 2007-8 (henceforth, “House of Lords Report”), paragraph 243. 
39 House of Lords Report (n. 38, above) paragraphs 137 and 119. See also Article 31(1) of the Basic Regulation. 
40 Green Paper, Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, COM (2009) 163 final, Brussels, 22.4.2009, 6. Article 2(2)(c) 
of the Basic Regulation. 
41 Communication from the Commission “Review of the functioning of the Regional Advisory Councils”, COM 
(2008) 364 final, Brussels 17.06.2008, 3. 
42 See Articles 3 and 5(2) of Council Decision of 16 July 2004 establishing Regional Advisory Councils under the 
Common Fisheries Policy (OJ L 256/17, 3.8.2004), henceforth, “the Council Decision establishing the RACs”. On the 
contrast with the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture – the other main forum of participation in the 
Common Fisheries Policy – see Joana Mendes, PARTICIPATION IN EU RULE-MAKING. A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), 99-100. 
43 Joan O’Mahony, The Promises and Pitfalls of Participation: What Voice for the Regional Advisory Councils? in OPENING EU-
GOVERNANCE TO CIVIL SOCIETY. GAINS AND CHALLENGES. (Beate Kohler-Koch, Dirk De Bièvre and William 
Maloney eds., CONNEX Report Series No 5, Manheim, 2008), 223, 225. 
44 Article 5(3) of the Council Decision establishing the RACs; Article 52(1) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy, COM (2011) 425 final, Brussels, 13.7.2011. 
The lower weight of non-fishing interests and of the non-industrial fishing interests has been a reason of concern (see 
House of Lords Report (n. 38 above) paragraphs 127 and 128; COM (2008) 364 final, n. 42 above, 5 and 6). 
45 Article 31(1) of the Basic Regulation. For the areas of jurisdiction, see Annex I of the Council Decision establishing 
the RACs. 
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Concretely, the Commission “may” consult them in respect of measures it proposes on 
the basis of current Article 43 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.46 They may also be consulted in other matters, both by the Commission and by 
Member States.47 In addition, and importantly, they may submit recommendations and 
suggestions to the Commission and the Member States, including on implementation 
problems, and conduct other activities necessary for their functions.48 They are therefore 
not dependent on a Commission’s or on a Member State’s request to influence decision-
making, even if, at the end, their agenda may be driven by the Commission’s agenda.49  
The RACs’ powers have led them to become “active players” in the Common 
Fisheries Policy, according to the Commission’s assessment.50 The fact that both the 
Commission and the Member States need to reply to their recommendations “precisely” 
and timely is, to a limited extent, a guarantee that the EU and national institutions duly 
consider their views.51 Crucial to assess their effective influence is the extent to which the 
Commission takes on their advice. There are mixed indications in this respect.52 
Recommendations adopted by consensus, on the basis of scientific evidence, and 
compatible with the Common Fisheries Policy may have better chances of being 
followed,53 but these are not guarantees of effective influence. However, it is noteworthy 
that, in general terms, the Commission has attached a great deal of importance to taking 
into account the views received from interested parties. Indeed, it has adapted its 
decision-making procedures for deciding on annual fishing opportunities in order to 
create better conditions for effective consultations and to involve interested parties at an 
early stage. For this purpose, the Commission started issuing policy statements 
concerning its intentions for setting total allowable catches and adapted the timing for 
                                                                
46 Article 31(4) of the Basic Regulation. 
47 Idem. 
48 Article 31(5) of the Basic Regulation. 
49 House of Lords Report (n. 38 above), paragraph 125. 
50 COM (2008) 364 final (n. 42 above) 8. 
51 Article 7(3) of the Council Decision establishing the RACs. The formulation put forth in the 2011 Commission’s 
proposal is slightly vaguer: there is no reference to answering “precisely” and the ultimate time limit of three months 
disappears (Article 53(2) of the 2011 Proposal - COM (2011) 425 final - n. 44, above). 
52 House of Lords Report (n. 38 above), paragraphs 125 and 138; COM (2008) 364 final (n. 42 above) 9. 
53 House of Lords Report (n. 38 above), paragraph 125 (the Commission has a different view on the relevance given to 
consensual recommendations – see COM (2008) 364 final (n. 42 above) 9; on the position of dissenting views, see 
Case T-91/07, WWF-UK v Council, paragraphs 72 and 75); Communication from the Commission, “Consulting on 
Fishing Opportunities for 2010”, COM (2009) 224 final, Brussels, 12.5.2009, 11, where the Commission admits that 
“stakeholders’ advice can only be used by the Commission when it is developed using an evidence-based approach to 
sustainable fishing”. 
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elaborating its proposals to the Council.54 This is a strong indication of the importance it 
attributed to consultation in EU fisheries management, which is confirmed by its recently 
manifested intention to consolidate and extend the experience with the RACs.55 In 
addition, by legal determination, the Council while adopting measures governing access 
to waters and resources as well as the sustainable pursuit of fishing activities, needs to 
take into account, among other factors, the advice received from the RACs.56 
In general, the effects of the RACs’ intervention in the Common Fisheries Policy 
have been positively evaluated, even if cautiously so either because of their relative 
novelty or because of their diversity.57 The Commission pointed out that they “have 
delivered better access to information and better understanding of decisions taken at the 
European level” and “have helped soften hostility towards the CFP, thus facilitating 
further direct contacts between stakeholders, EU officials, Member States and 
scientists”.58 The House of Lords, on the basis of the evidence received in the course of 
its mid-term review of the 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, considered the 
establishment of the RACs as “the most positive development to flow from this 
reform”.59 Others have expressed similar views on the importance of these bodies.60 The 
decision of the Council to provide them permanent funding, in contrast to what was 
initially envisaged, was seen as an official recognition of their significance.61  
                                                                
54 Communication from the Commission, “Improving consultation on Community fisheries management”, COM 
(2006) 246 final, Brussels, 24.5.2006, 8-11. The policy statements issued so far are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm (accessed February 23, 2012). On the importance 
of consultations, see in particular the following policy statements: COM (2007) 295 final, p. 3, 4 and 8. COM (2008) 
331 final, 12; COM (2009) 224 final, 11; COM (2010) 241 final, p. 9-10. 
55 COM (2011) 425 final (n. 44 above), 10. 
56 Article 4(2) of the Basic Regulation. The guarantees of participation of RACs are not extended to RACs individual 
members – see Case T-91/07, WWF-UK Ltd v Council, 2008 E.C.R. II-81, paragraph 72. 
57 House of Lords Report (n. 38 above), paragraph 124; Sissenwine and Symes (n. 37 above), 66; COM (2008) 364 final 
(n. 42 above), 8 (“the RACs are still going through a learning process”); Ronán Long, The Role of Regional Advisory 
Councils in the European Common Fisheries Policy: Legal Constraints and Future Options 25 The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 289, 316 (2010); O’Mahony (n. 43 above) 229-231. 
58 COM (2008) 364 final (n. 42 above), 8. 
59 House of Lords Report (n. 38 above), paragraphs 136 and 226. 
60 Sissenwine and Symes (n. 37 above), 45. Indrani Luchtman and others, “Towards a Reform of the Common 
Fisheries Policy in 2012 – a CFP Health Check”, IEEP London, 2009, 28 (available at 
http://www.ieep.eu/assets/440/cfp_healthcheck.pdf, accessed February 23, 2012). 
61 Idem. See Council Decision No 2007/409/EC, of 11 June 2007, amending Decision 2004/585/EC establishing 
Regional Advisory Councils under the Common Fisheries Policy (O.J. L 155/68, 15.6.2007). 
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It follows from the above that consultation of the RACs is an important 
procedural standard against which to assess both the legal and social legitimacy of 
fisheries management. 
The RACs and the external dimension of the EU Common Fisheries Policy 
In contrast to the importance attributed to the RACs within the EU Common 
Fisheries Policy, their role is considerably limited, if not inexistent, with regard to 
decision-making procedures whereby the Council transposes to EU law decisions of 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). These organizations are 
established by international agreements and have the powers to adopt fisheries 
conservation and management measures that are binding on their members.62 The EU is 
party to many RFMOs and is as such under the duty to transpose their binding decisions 
into EU law.63 In addition, it may of course choose to incorporate their non-binding 
measures. Among other fisheries management measures, the RFMOs establish total 
allowable catches, which are divided into quotas allocated to the members of the 
organizations, and may adopt long-term plans for the recovery of fish stocks.64 The 
fishing opportunities in the areas covered by regional fisheries organizations are 
therefore defined in the framework of those organizations and then incorporated in EU 
law. Recent examples include total allowable catches regarding highly migratory fish and 
the new recovery plan for bluefin tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.65 
                                                                
62 See further Communication from the Commission “Community participation in Regional Fisheries Organizations 
(RFOs), COM (1999) 613 final Brussels, 8.12.1999, 6-9; Robin Churchill and Daniel Owen, THE EC COMMON 
FISHERIES POLICY (Oxford University Press, 2010), 112-118 and 359. E.g. Article VIII and X(1) of the International 
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (available at 
http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Commission/BasicTexts.pdf, accessed April 19, 2013). 
63 COM (1999) 613 final (n. 62 above), 9, 12-13; Churchill and Owen (n. 62 above), 359, 360-375. 
64 See e.g. Article 5(g) and 10(1)(a) to (d) of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (available at http://www.wcpfc.int/key-documents/convention-
text); Article V(2)(c) and (3) of the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (available 
at http://www.iotc.org/English/info/basictext.php); Articles 7(1)(b)-(c) and 13  of the Convention for the 
Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean (available at http://www.nasco.int/convention.html). All sites 
were last accessed on February 23, 2012. 
65 Annex ID of Council Regulation (EU) No 57/2011, of 18 January 2011, fixing the fishing opportunities for certain 
fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in EU waters and, for EU vessels, in certain non-EU waters (OJ L 
24/1, 27.1.2011); Council Regulation (EC) No 302/2009, of 6 April 2009, concerning a multiannual recovery plan for 
bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, amending Regulation (EC) No 43/2009 and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1559/2007 (O.J. L 96/1, 15.4.2009). On the implications the latter may have, see Case C-221/09, 
AJD Tuna Ltd v Direttur tal-Agrikoltura u s-Sajd, Avukat Generali, 2011, nyr. 
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The Commission has been rather open regarding the limited role of the RACs in 
fisheries management measures adopted by the RFMOs and transposed into EU law. It 
has declared that in its negotiations with third countries the Commission “cannot impose 
its views unilaterally but must seek a compromise with its counterparts”.66 Accordingly, it 
has decided to exclude its negotiating position in RFMOs from the policy statements 
where it defines, for purposes of consultation, its intentions for setting total allowable 
catches.67 
Therefore, in the cases were total allowable catches are set by RFMOs and then 
incorporated in EU law, the possibilities of participation of interested parties in decision-
making depends on the rules applicable to each RFMO.68 These vary, but in general the 
procedural guarantees are lower than those granted by EU law to the RACs. In most 
cases, non-governmental organizations may participate as observers in the meetings of 
Fisheries Commissions – i.e. the bodies of the RFMOs that adopt binding measures 
regarding fisheries management.69 There does not seem to be any concern regarding a 
balanced representation of concerned interests, in contrast to what the EU Commission 
has proposed with regard to the RACs.70 Participation by observers of non-governmental 
organizations depends on request and on the approval of the members of the respective 
                                                                
66 COM (2008) 364 final (n. 42 above), 9. 
67 COM (2006) 246 final (n. 54 above), 9. 
68 The following considerations are based on the analysis of RFMOs that have powers to adopt measures binding on 
their members and of which the EU is a member. The following were considered: North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC), Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), North Atlantic Salmon Conservation 
Organisation (NASCO), South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO), South Pacific Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisation (SPRFMO – note that the respective Convention has been signed by the EU, but was not 
yet ratified), Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), General Fisheries 
Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT), Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). Also the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna (CCSBT) was examined: even though the EU is not a party, it plays “an active role” as a “cooperating non-
member” (http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/rfmo/index_en.htm and http://www.ccsbt.org/site/ 
accessed February 23, 2012) although it is not clear from the text of the convention what this may imply. 
69 E.g. Article 14(2) of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/site/basic_documents.php, accessed February 23, 2012); Article XXIII(4) of the Convention 
CCAMLR (available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/bd/toc.htm, accessed February 23, 2012) - in addition, 
the Convention specifies that the Commission may establish “cooperative working relationships” with, inter alia, non-
governmental organizations). See also nn. 71 to 85 below. “Fisheries Commission” in the following paragraphs refers 
to the Commission of the RFMOs cited in the footnotes. 
70 See n. 44 above. 
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Fisheries Commission, or, at least, on the absence of objections on their part.71 
Specifically, the request for the participation of non-governmental organizations may 
need to include information regarding the organization’s competence concerning the 
scope of the Fisheries Commission’s action or the organization’s competence to 
contribute to the attainment of the objectives of the Convention.72 In some cases, 
observers may be excluded from the discussion of specific points in the agenda, upon a 
request of a member of the Fisheries Commission.73 In addition, the status of observers 
may be subject to revocation by a decision of the Fisheries Commission.74 Finally, the 
formal role of observers may be limited to distributing documents in the meetings of the 
Fisheries Commission.75 Also when they have broader possibilities of intervention – e.g. 
making oral statements – these depend on the discretion of the chairman.76 In sum, the 
Fisheries Commissions and their members have a wide discretion regarding the 
admission of observers to their meetings as well as their role once they are admitted. In 
the absence of other rules that ensure effective opportunities of participation to 
observers, this status as such does not provide proper procedural guarantees.  
In a few cases, the provisions on the participation of non-governmental 
organizations as observers to the meetings of Fisheries Commissions are part of a 
broader set of rules aimed at ensuring transparency of the Commissions’ work. Of the 
twelve RFMOs analyzed,77 three Conventions envisage rules of this type: the Convention 
                                                                
71 E.g. Rule 3(6) and (9) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(http://www.ccsbt.org/site/basic_documents.php); Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure of the NEAFC Commission 
(http://www.neafc.org/basictexts); Rule 30(e) of the Rules of Procedure of the CCAMLR Commission 
(http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/bd/toc.htm); Rule 38 (j) of the Rules of Procedure for the SEAFO 
Commission (http://www.seafo.org/AURulesProcredures.html); Rule XIII(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the IOTC 
Commission (http://www.iotc.org/English/info/rules_proced.php); Point 4 of the Guidelines and Criteria for 
Granting Observer Status at ICCAT Meetings 
(http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Meetings/SCRS2011/OBSERVER_ENG.pdf, all accessed February 23, 2012). 
72 E.g. Rule 3(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna; with 
similar effect, see Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure for the NEAFC Commission, and Rule 38 of the Rules of 
Procedure for the SEAFO Commission. 
73 E.g. Rule 3(8) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.  
74 Rule 38 (k) of the Rules of Procedure for the SEAFO Commission. 
75 E.g. Rule 3(10) and (11) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna; Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the CCAMLR Commission (in this case, only if a member of the 
Commission objects to observers addressing the Commission, under Rule 34); Rules 37 of the Rules of Procedure for 
the SEAFO Commission (see also Rule 36). 
76 E.g. Rules 12 and 37 of the Rules of Procedure for the NEAFC Commission; Rules 36 of the Rules of Procedure for 
the SEAFO Commission; Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of IATTC. 
77 See n. 68 above. 
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on the Conservation and Management of High Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (“the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention”);78 the 
Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (the 
“Antigua Convention”);79 and the Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
the High Seas Fishery Resources of the South Pacific Ocean (the “South Pacific Fisheries 
Convention”). Moreover, it is possible that in the future other RFMOs will envisage rules 
on transparency that go beyond the provision of information and include provisions on 
participation.80 
In these cases, the role of observers is subject to relatively less constraining rules 
than the ones described above.81 But the most interesting aspect of these Conventions, 
for current purposes, is the fact that they broaden the possibilities of participation by 
non-governmental interested parties – including representatives of environmental and 
fish industry interests – beyond their possible status as observers.82 In two cases, the 
Conventions determine that the respective Fisheries Commission must promote 
transparency in its implementation activities, including, inter alia, decision-making that 
“as appropriate” includes “consultations with, and the effective participation of, non-
governmental organizations, representatives of the fishing industry, particularly the 
fishing fleet, and other interested bodies and individuals”.83 While another convention 
does not entail a similar norm, it specifies that the rules of procedure of the respective 
Fisheries Commission must provide for participation and must “not be unduly restrictive 
                                                                
78 The text of the Convention is available at http://www.wcpfc.int/key-documents/convention-text (accessed 
February 23, 2012). 
79 The respective text is available at http://www.iattc.org/IATTCDocumentsENG.htm (accessed February 23, 2012). 
80 An amended text of the NAFO Convention signed in 2007 and not yet legally binding due to an insufficient number 
of ratifications has a similar provisions to those of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention, the Antigua 
Convention and the South Pacific Fisheries Convention mentioned above (Article IV(5)(g) of the Amendment to the 
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, available at 
http://www.nafo.int/about/frames/about.html, accessed February 23, 2012). In contrast, the last amendment to the 
GFCM Convention was signed in 1997 and did not change the rules in this respect.  
81 Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/commission-01/rules-procedure, accessed February 23, 2012). Rule XIII. Annex 2 of the 
Antigua Convention, however, gives broader possibilities of members’ objection to observers’ participation (see point 
7). 
82 All provide that they may participate “as observers or otherwise as appropriate”: Article 21 of the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Convention; Article XVI(2) of the Antigua Convention; and Article 18(4) of the South Pacific 
Fisheries Convention. 
83 Article XVI(1)(b) of the Antigua Convention and Article 18(3) of the South Pacific Fisheries Convention, emphasis 
added. 
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in this respect”.84 Furthermore, participants must be given timely access to relevant 
information.85  
These provisions could ground opportunities of participation that, depending on 
practice, could be considered functionally equivalent to the access given to 
representatives of interests affected in the definition of the EU Common Fisheries 
Policy. The texts of the Conventions give considerable leeway to the respective Fisheries 
Commissions in accommodating the requirements of participation they establish – 
participation possibilities, other than those inherent in the observer status, ought to be 
given “as appropriate”.86 However, beyond the norms of the Convention, the respective 
rules of procedure are silent about participation possibilities different from those granted 
to observers.  It is therefore difficult to assess without detailed empirical research what 
the boarder possibilities of participation envisaged in the respective Conventions 
effectively represent in these cases. Given the lack of further indications in the rules of 
procedure of the Fisheries Commissions analyzed, one may submit that these other 
avenues of participation have not yet been implemented. 
It follows from the above that the international regimes governing RFMOs, as they 
currently stand, do not provide guarantees of involvement of non-governmental 
interested parties in their decision-making procedures similar to the ones existent in EU 
fisheries law. Whether intervening as observers “or otherwise as appropriate” – to use 
the terms of the Conventions mentioned above – interest representatives do not need to 
be consulted by legal determination, nor can they expect to have a reply regarding the 
views expressed.  
A matter of internal or external policy 
As a result, when assessing how technocratic or participative the governance of the 
EU Common Fisheries Policy is, a distinction should be made between the internal and 
the external dimension of this policy. Purely internal decision-making procedures 
regarding fisheries management measures comply with the legal norms that require the 
Council to take into account the views expressed by the RACs – this of course does not 
imply that the comments submitted by RACs need to be followed. This contrasts with 
decision-making procedures whereby measures adopted by RFMOs are transposed into 
                                                                
84 Article 21 of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention (Article 18(4) of the South Pacific Fisheries 
Convention contains a similar provision).  
85 Article 21 of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention; Article XVI(2) of the Antigua Convention; 
Article 18(4) of the South Pacific Fisheries Convention. 
86 See n. 82 above  
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EU law. Firstly, given the Commission’s position mentioned above,87 it is very likely that 
the RACs’ guarantees of participation be trumped.  Secondly, as just argued, even 
admitting that the interests represented in the RACs could be voiced in RFMOs 
decision-making procedures, the rules on participation applicable to these organizations 
do not provide guarantees of involvement of the affected interests’ representatives 
similar to those applicable in EU law. This is all the more relevant as, already in 1999, the 
Commission indicated “the volume of Council regulations that transpose RFMOs 
recommendations has been growing annually with the rise in the number of 
recommendations adopted by the organizations and the increase in the number of 
RFMOs in which the Community is involved”.88 In the same document the 
Commission alerted that EU participation in RFMOs “needs to be considered from the 
point of view of consistency of the internal and external aspects of the Common 
Fisheries Policy”.89  
Consistency between the internal and external action of the EU is, moreover, a 
general requirement established by the EU Treaty.90 However, the considerably lower 
guarantees of participation in the segments of this policy that result from international 
decisions does not seem to be on the agenda. The Commission considers that improving 
RFMOs’ decision-making procedures is an important aspect of ensuring compliance with 
their decisions.91 Yet – despite the role attributed to the RACs with regard to issues of 
compliance, the fact that the 2011 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy envisages 
strengthening the role of the RACs,92 and the lack of consistency between the internal 
and the external aspects of the EU fisheries policy – the modifications the Commission 
suggests with regard to RFMOs’ decision-making procedures do not include any 
reference to participation.93  
 
                                                                
87 It should be recalled that the Council decides on total allowable catches on the basis of a Commission proposal 
(Article 20(1) of the Basic Regulation). 
88 COM (1999) 613 final (n. 62 above), 13. 
89 Idem, 4. 
90 Article 21(3) TEU. See further, Marise Cremona, Coherence Through Law: what difference will the Treaty of Lisbon make? 3 
HAMBURG REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 11 (2008). 
91 Communication from the Commission, “External Dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy”, COM (2011) 424 
final, Brussels 13.7.2011, 9. 
92 See n. 55 above and also COM (2009) 163 final (n. 40 above), 21. 
93 COM (2011) 424 final (n. 91 above), 9, footnote 11. 
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Wildlife trade: CITES and EU procedures 
The interaction between the regime established by the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and EU 
law is interesting for current purposes, as it offers a contrasting example of the impact 
that the interplay between global regulatory regimes and EU law may have in terms of 
procedural standards. Indeed, the procedural rules on participation and practices of 
transparency seem to be more developed within CITES than in EU law, at least in what 
concerns the procedure for the designation of species trade in which is subject to 
control. CITES aims at contributing to the protection and conservation of endangered 
species by regulating trade of specimens.94 The EU implements the Convention’s legal 
regime, including the decisions adopted by the respective Conference of the Parties 
(CoP), by effect of the EU CITES Regulation.95 
This interaction raises a preliminary issue. The EU is not a party to CITES. 
Following the general rules of reception defined by the Court,96 in legal terms, the 
decisions of the CITES CoPs do not constrain the EU in any way, unlike the decisions 
of the RFMOs analyzed above. When the EU changes its rules on trade in wildlife as a 
result of a measure adopted by the CITES CoPs, it does so on a purely voluntary basis. 
Despite the deviation from the general rules, in this case there can be little doubts about 
the legitimacy of this interaction in terms of EU law, as it still finds its basis on the 
institutional scheme defined in the Treaty. The EU institutions that defined the CITES 
regime – under which the CoPs decisions are translated into the EU legal system – are 
the same that define the EU international commitments, only that in this case they act as 
legislator.97  
CITES regulates international trade of animals and plants of the species listed in 
the appendices to the Convention on the basis of a system of permits and certificates 
issued by national management authorities subject to pre-defined criteria.98 In basic 
terms, the CITES regulatory system relies, on the one hand, on enforcement by national 
                                                                
94 The goal is not explicitly stated in the text of the Convention (available at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php#texttop), but features in the CITES website 
(http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php, both accessed February 23, 2012). 
95 Regulation (EC) No 338/97, of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating 
trade therein (O.J. L 61/1, 3.3.1997). 
96 See Section 2 above. 
97 See, further, Section 4 below. 
98 Articles III to VI of the Convention. 
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authorities,99 and, on the other, on the recommendations issued by the CoP that, inter 
alia, adapt the roll of listed species, thereby adapting the appendices when needed in view 
of the purposes of the Convention.100 The following analysis will focus on the latter. The 
CoP decisions are of highly political relevance and have a considerable impact on the 
obligations of the Parties and, indirectly, on the obligations of individuals.101 The 
appendices list species threatened with extinction, trade in which is only allowed in 
exceptional circumstances (Appendix 1),102 species not threatened with extinction but 
that may be at risk if not subject to controls (Appendix 2),103 and species included at the 
request of a Party, because the respective trade is controlled by national regulation with a 
view to prevent or restrict exploitation and control of trade requires the cooperation of 
other countries (Appendix 3).104 Appendices 1 and 2 may only be adapted by the CoP, 
which has therefore exclusive powers to add, remove or move species between the two 
appendices.105 The list of Appendix 3 may be changed at any time and by any Party 
unilaterally, by communication to the Secretariat.106 
EU law implements the CITES regime and defines additional restrictive measures 
for trade applicable to the EU Member States. As such, the annexes of the EU CITES 
Regulation contain not only the CITES species, for some of which the EU has adopted 
stricter rules, but also non-CITES species.107 The EU implements the listing decisions of 
the CITES CoPs by adapting the annexes of the EU CITES Regulation accordingly.108 In 
                                                                
99 Articles VIII and XIII of the Convention. Peter H. Sand, Whither CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime in the 
Borderland of Trade and Environment, 8 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 46-48 (1997).  
100 Articles XI(2) and XV of the Convention. The legal value of the CoP recommendations is disputed (Rosalind 
Reeve, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES. THE CITES TREATY AND COMPLIANCE (The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002), 41-42). In any event, they have been crucial for the development of 
CITES (see, e.g., Reeve, idem; Sand (n. 99 above), 35-38 and Rosalind Reeve, Wildlife trade, sanctions and compliance: lessons 
from the CITES regime, 82 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 881, 882).  
101 For an example, see Philippe Sands and Albert Bedecarre, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora: the Role of Public Interest Non-Governmental Organizations in Ensuring Effective Enforcement of the Ivory Trade 
Ban, 17 BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 799, 806-809 (1999). 
102 Articles II(1), III, and VII of the Convention. 
103 Articles II(2), IV, and VII of the Convention. 
104 Articles II(3), V, and VII of the Convention. 
105 Article XV of the Convention. 
106 Article XVI of the Convention. 
107 Article 3 of the EU CITES Regulation. For a quick overview of the differences between the EU regulation and 
CITES, see Commission document available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/legislation_en.htm (accessed 
February 23, 2012). 
108 E.g. Commission Regulation (EU) No 709/2010 of 22 July 2010 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on 
the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ L 212/1, 12.8.2010). 
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addition, it may take action regarding wildlife trade by, inter alia, amending the annexes 
of the EU CITES Regulation on its own initiative, irrespective of CoP decisions.109 
Interestingly, the CITES Convention as well as the rules of procedure followed by 
the CITES CoP and by the CITES committees that operate in between the CoP 
meetings provide guarantees of participation to non-governmental organizations in the 
procedures of adaptation of the CITES appendices unparalleled by the formal rules 
followed for the modification of the annexes of the EU CITES Regulation. 
Amendments to the CITES appendices may be proposed by any Party and are decided 
by the majority of Parties’ votes after consultation with other Parties and interested inter-
governmental bodies.110 According to the Convention, “any body or agency” technically 
qualified in protection, conservation and management of wild fauna and flora, either 
governmental or non-governmental, international or national, may participate in the 
meetings of the CoPs as observers, if their request is not objected by one third of the 
Parties present.111 Once admitted, these observers shall have “the right to participate but 
not to vote”.112 This provision is replicated in the rules of procedure of the CoP.113 
Registration is dependent upon an assessment by the Secretariat of the agency’s or body’s 
qualification in the protection, conservation or management of wild fauna and flora and 
upon demonstration of their legal personality and international character.114 Moreover, 
the Chairmen of the Plants Committee and of the Animals Committee may invite “any 
person or representative of any body, agency or organization verifiably technically qualified in 
protection, conservation or management of wild fauna and flora to participate at the 
meetings […] including those carried out in working groups” as observers.115 These 
                                                                
109 It may also take action to change the appendices of the CITES Convention, through one of its Member States 
(Opinion 2/91, Convention Nº 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals 
at work, 1993, E.C.R. I-1061, paragraph 5; Case C-370/07, Commission v Council, 2009, E.C.R. I-8917).  
110 These are the broad lines of the procedure for the amendment of Appendices I and II – see Article XV of the 
Convention for more details and Article XVI for the procedure to amend Appendix II. 
111 Article XI(7) of the Convention. National non-governmental agencies or bodies must be approved for these 
purposes in the State in which they are located (Article XI(7)(b)). See also Article XII(1) of the Convention, on 
participation in the activities of the Secretariat. 
112 Idem, emphasis added. 
113 Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties (as amended at the 14th meeting, The Hague, 
2007), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/index.php (accessed February 23, 2012). 
114 Resolution Conf. 13.8 (available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/13/13-08.php, accessed February 23, 2012). 
115 Rule 7(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Plants Committee and of the Rules of Procedure 
for Meetings of the Animals Committee (both adopted at the 17th meeting, Geneva, April 2008, effective from 20 
April 2008), available, respectively, at http://www.cites.org/eng/com/pc/index.php and 
http://www.cites.org/eng/com/ac/index.php (both accessed February 23, 2012). 
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Committees prepare the work of the CoPs. They play a decisive role in assessing the 
status of the listed species and, therefore, in the review of the respective listings.116 
Recognizing the “valuable contributions of observers”, the CoP instructed the 
presiding officers at plenary and committee sessions “to make every effort to allow 
observers time in the sessions to make interventions while giving them a time limit for 
speaking if necessary”.117 In addition, it equally instructed the Secretariat “to make every 
effort to ensure that informative documents on the conservation and utilization of 
natural resources, prepared by observers for distribution at a meeting of the Conference 
of the Parties are distributed to the participants in the meeting”.118 At the Committee 
level, according to the respective rules of procedure, non-governmental organizations 
may provide documents, either through the national CITES management authority of 
the Party where they are located – if they have a national scope – or to the CITES 
Secretariat – if they have an international character.119 If accepted for distribution, these 
documents should be placed on the Secretariat’s website “as soon as possible after they 
are received”.120 The Parties directly affected by their discussion are informed and may 
request copies.121 
These rules indicate a considerable degree of openness of decision-making 
procedures of the CoP and of the CITES Committees to the participation of non-state 
actors.122 It is true that, similarly to the rules on the admission of observers to the 
meetings of the Fisheries Commission, participation of interest representatives ultimately 
depends on a decision of the Parties. Nevertheless, once admitted, the rules mentioned 
above may support an active role by observers in decision-making. Furthermore, the 
status of observer may be granted to “any body or agency” – in the case of the CoP – or 
“any person” – in the case of the Committees – that fulfils the conditions mentioned. 
Studies of the CoPs’ practice indicate that indeed non-governmental bodies play a 
                                                                
116 See Resolution Conf 11.1 (Rev CoP15), Establishment of Committees (available at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php, accessed February 23, 2012). 
117 Idem. On their right to speak, see Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the CoP and, at Committee level, Rule 25 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Committees (n. 115 above).  
118 Resolution Conf 11.1 (n. 116 above). 
119 Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committees (n. 115 above). 
120 Rule 22, idem. 
121 Idem. 
122 Openness is used here in the broad sense of access to information and access to decision-making procedures (as 
used in Deirdre Curtin and Joana Mendes, Transparence et Participation: des Principes Démocratiques pour l'Administration de 
l'Union Européenne, in 137-138 REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 101 (2011) 103. 
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significant role, not only in decision-making – even if deprived of a right to vote – but 
also monitoring compliance and enforcement.123 The Committees work in cooperation 
with external scientific bodies, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in 
their preparatory work that leads to the adaptation of the appendices at the COPs.124 In 
general – i.e. not only during the procedure for amending the listings – NGOs supply 
information to the CITES Secretariat that identify problems and base CITES’ action.125 
The collaboration between NGOs and the CITES governing bodies may be subject to 
criticism, but has also been pointed out as one of the factors of the relative success of the 
Convention.126 The International Council for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN), together with Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in 
Commerce (TRAFFIC, partially funded by the IUCN and the World Wild Fund for 
Nature – WWF), are the NGOs that work most closely with CITES. Both play an active 
role in the process of revising the CITES appendices. Namely, they analyze the proposals 
put forth by the Parties and the documents they produce are submitted for discussion at 
the CoPs following the rules explained above.127 But various other NGOs participate in 
the CoPs and in the meetings of the permanent committees.128 
In this case, the degree of openness revealed by the CITES formal rules contrasts 
with the decision-making procedure followed by the EU for the adaptation of the lists of 
its CITES Regulation. Participation rules are absent and the flow of information seems 
to be purely internal (i.e. involving the Commission, the Member States and the Scientific 
Review Committee, which is also composed of Member States representatives).129 The 
                                                                
123 Reeve, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (n. 100 above) 32, 38; Sands and Bedecarre (n. 101 above), 799-823. 
Active participation in decision-making and a relatively high degree of influence in the outcomes was confirmed by the 
services of the Portuguese CITES Management Authority, whose availability the author gratefully acknowledges.  
124 Sand (n. 99 above), 37. Reeve, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (n. 100 above), 50. 
125 Reeve, Wildlife, trade, sanctions (n. 100 above), 883. 
126 David M. Ong, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES, 1973): Implication of Recent 
Developments in International and EC Environmental Law, 10 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 291, 293 (1998). Sand (n. 
99 above), 50. 
127 See http://www.traffic.org/cites/ (accessed February 23, 2012). The list of documents submitted to the CITES is 
available online and confirms this information (see, e.g., idem 18 of the list of documents submitted to the CoP15 at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/inf/index.shtml, accessed February 23, 2012). 
128 Reeve, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (n. 100 above), 46. The list of participants is available at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/index.shtml (accessed February 23, 2012). 
129 Article 15(5) of the EU CITES Regulation and Article 70 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 of 4 May 
2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the 
protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (O.J. L 166/1, 19.6.2006). The Scientific 
Review Group was established by Article 17 of the EU CITES Regulation. 
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decisions for adapting the respective annexes are adopted by the Commission – or by the 
Council – following a comitology procedure, which, as is known, involves the opinion of 
a committee composed by representatives of the Member States and is chaired by a 
representative of the Commission.130 The agenda and summaries of the meetings of the 
committee are accessible on line, this being the only information available (at least to the 
general public) regarding their work.131 No opportunities for the participation of non-
state interested persons are envisaged. Admittedly, Member States representatives may 
individually consult NGOs on the matters that will be discussed at the meetings. But this 
informal lobbying, where existent, is not supported by any procedural standards and it is 
limited since it does not allow to directly influence the discussions held at the 
Committee’s meetings. 
Hollowing out procedural standards? 
The examples above provide disparate results as to the effects that the reception of 
decisions adopted by international organizations or bodies in EU law may have in terms 
of procedural standards. At any rate, whichever the effect, observance of procedural 
standards is decided by the system of origin, as EU law and practice seem to “withdraw” 
its own standards in situations of reception. Arguably, in most cases, this will lead to a 
negative impact in procedural standards that would otherwise apply by force of EU 
law.132 CITES is, in this respect, an exceptional case. First, the significant role played by 
NGOs is, at least in part, a legacy of the very origins of the Convention.133 The 
International Council for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) drafted 
the text that would later become the CITES Convention and administered its Secretariat 
in the first years.134 Although NGO participation in decision-making of international 
organizations is increasing, especially in international environmental law, the rules and 
practices of participation of CITES still stand out as particularly open.135 Secondly, at 
present, EU rules imposing participation in non-legislative rule-making are frequent but 
not a rule. Practices of consultation are often integrated in impact assessment procedures 
                                                                
130 Articles 19(5) and 18(4) of the EU CITES Regulation. This procedure does not apply to amendments of Annex A 
of the EU CITES Regulation that do not result from decisions of the CITES CoPs (Article 19(5)). 
131 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/ctwff_en.htm (accessed February 23, 2012). 
132 See also the examples analyzed in Mendes, Administrative Law Beyond the State (n. 33 above). 
133 Reeves, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (n. 100 above), 46. 
134 Sand (n. 99 above), 33-34. 
135 Kal Raustiala, The ‘Participatory Revolution’ in International Environmental Law, 21 HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
REVIEW 537, 551 and 569 (1997).  
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mostly ancillary to legislative procedures. But this is likely to change as a result of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, mainly of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union.136 The case of 
CITES, nonetheless, demonstrates that one should not be too hasty in assuming, on the 
basis of the EU’s principles of good governance (e.g. Article 15(1) TFEU), that EU 
decision-making procedures are likely to be more open to participation than those 
followed by global regulatory regimes. In this case, the relationship between EU law and 
international law stresses the internal inconsistencies of the EU in terms of procedural 
standards – i.e. it highlights one of the areas of EU law and practice that still escape the 
norms on participation and transparency now enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty.137 
Therefore, it seems to pose only an internal problem.  
In the cases in which lower procedural standards are followed when EU decision-
making results from the transposition of decisions of international organizations or 
bodies, the substantive and procedural issues that may be at stake are admittedly not of 
the fundamental constitutional nature of those involved in the reception of the UN 
Security Council resolutions on economic sanctions (in particular in the Kadi case), which 
justified further limits of reception placed by the Court of Justice. Fundamental rights are 
not imperiled (at least not in their subjective dimension). Participation in the cases 
analyzed does not pertain to the core of due process respect of which is essential to a 
legal system based on the rule of law. Nor does it affect the allocation of powers under 
the Treaties, as, using the Court’s words, “the essential character of the powers of the 
Community and its institutions as conceived in the Treaty [remains] unaltered”.138  
Yet, the procedural rules that may be bypassed constitute procedural standards 
defined to legitimize the exercise of public authority. Depending on the rules at stake, 
they may be give effect to norms of EU law and governance now enshrined in the 
Treaties, such as openness and participation. Both in the EU and in national settings, 
these have become means of ‘democratic supplementation’ applicable to decision-making 
procedures that, for different reasons and in different degrees, largely escape the 
intervention of electorally accountable institutions.139 The fact that such procedural 
standards may be bypassed in cases of reception of decisions of international 
                                                                
136 Joana Mendes, Participation and the role of law after Lisbon: a legal view on Article 11 TEU in 48 COMMON MARKET LAW 
REVIEW,1849 (2011). 
137 Articles 1 and 11 TEU; Articles 15(1) and 298(1) TFEU.  
138 Opinion 1/00 (n. 2 above), paragraph 12. 
139 Mattias Kumm The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis in 15 EUROPEAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 907, 925-926 (2004). 
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organizations or bodies has legitimacy risks in a context in which, more and more, the 
areas of competence of the EU are covered by global regulatory regimes in which the 
EU is involved, either as a party, as observer or through its Member States acting jointly 
in the interest of the Union. Ultimately, reception of international decisions may lead to 
avoiding internal procedural controls, even if this may be an unintended effect of EU 
participation in global regulatory arenas. In some cases, this effect is aggravated by the 
fact that the scheme by which international decisions are incorporated in the EU legal 
system deviates from the general rules of reception. This raises more fundamental doubts 
regarding the legitimacy of incorporation. 
4. Systemic and a-systemic entry points  
The cases analyzed above illustrate different ways of receiving decisions of 
international bodies in the EU legal order that, formally in one case and by analogy in the 
other, abide to the general rules of reception presented in Section 2. These ensure that 
reception does not trump essential substantive and institutional rules of EU law and that 
it is consistent with the EU legal system. The grounds for their reception in EU law can 
still be pinned down to the rationale of consent mentioned above, even if only by 
analogy in the case of CITES. The international conventions under which the Fisheries 
Commissions operate were signed and ratified by the EU,140 which thereby agreed to the 
respective powers to decide on the fishing opportunities in their respective geographic 
regions. The decisions of the Fisheries Commissions are placed within the institutional 
framework of the conventions and give effect to them. There is therefore a close 
connection between the multilateral agreements and these decisions.  
The source of the EU international commitment with regard to the decisions of 
the CITES CoP is different. As mentioned, the EU is not a Party to the CITES 
Convention. Its accession to CITES is dependent on the entry into force of the 
Gaborone amendment to the text of the Convention that would permit accession by 
regional economic integration organizations.141 Therefore, the choice to receive internally 
the decisions of the respective CoP remains purely voluntary. However, incorporation 
takes place through an act adopted by the Council on the basis of the Treaty rules, which 
now require also the intervention of the European Parliament. It is justified by the EU 
                                                                
140 With one exception, see n. 68 above. 
141 See http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/gaborone.php (accessed February 23, 2012). 
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competences in environmental policy and in external trade, as well as by the internal 
market implications of the CITES regime, to which some of the Member States were 
parties prior to the EU CITES Regulation. CITES is not binding on the EU, but the EU 
through the same institutions that have the power to bind it to international agreements 
– albeit acting, in this case, with different relative powers – decided to fully implement it 
within the EU legal order. By doing so, the EU institutions recognized the decision-
making powers of the CITES CoP and consented to receiving its decisions in EU law. 
These decisions are transposed into EU law because the EU institutions decided to 
implement the CITES regime despite not being bound to it. 
This snapshot of the relationships between international and EU law does not 
capture the complexity of the interconnections between different regulatory regimes 
developed at the global and at the EU level. Administrative collaboration between 
regulatory bodies situated at different regulatory levels is an additional important element 
to consider as it may lead to other ways of percolating decisions of international bodies 
into the EU legal order and, therefore, opens other possibilities to eventually deplete 
procedural standards valid within the EU. The guidelines adopted by the International 
Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) are a case in point.142  
 
Medicines: ICH guidelines 
The ICH is an informal transnational body, described as a “joint 
regulatory/industry project” and analyzed as a “public/private platform”.143 It has a 
mixed public and private composition. While it involves representatives from EU and 
State regulatory entities (Japan and the US), it is composed also of private associations 
representing the pharmaceutical industry in these three regions. The international process 
of harmonization has been driven by the pharmaceutical industry.144  
                                                                
142 This case was analyzed in Mendes, Administrative Law Beyond the State (n. 33 above) from where the paragraphs in the 
following sub-section are drawn. 
143 See http://www.ich.org/, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/international-activities/multilateral-
relations/index_en.htm (accessed February 23, 2012) and Alessandro Spina, The Regulation of Pharmaceuticals Beyond the 
State: EU and Global Administrative Systems, in GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (n. 33 above), 258. 
144 On the origins of ICH, see Joseph Contrera, The Food and Drug Administration and the International Conference on 
Harmonization: How harmonious will international pharmaceutical regulations become?, 8 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL 927, 
939-40 (1995); David Vogel, The Globalization of Pharmaceutical Regulation, 11 GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL 
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The ICH guidelines define the scientific requirements that drug industry may need 
to follow when requesting a market authorization, in order to ensure and demonstrate 
the quality, safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products. They are intended to guide 
the assessment of the competent authorities and, by reducing the differences between the 
procedures for approval of medicines, reduce the costs of multinationals operating in the 
three regions represented in the ICH. ICH guidelines have, in EU law, the same status as 
other EU scientific guidelines, possibly replacing existing ones.145 It should be noted 
that, despite their non-binding nature, they have considerable constraining force in EU 
law. They are used by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to assess the applications 
for the authorization of medicines and, on the agency’s view, reflect “the best or most 
appropriate way to fulfill an obligation laid down in the [Union] pharmaceutical 
legislation”. Although the EMA admits that “alternative approaches may be taken”, these 
need to be “appropriately justified”.146 Proper and sufficient demonstration of the 
quality, safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products is, according to Article 12 of 
Regulation 726/2004, a sine qua non condition for the approval of medicines.147  
These guidelines are approved by the ICH Steering Committee following a 
procedure that is grafted onto the existing procedures within the three regions covered 
by the ICH. In the case of the EU, draft guidelines approved at a first stage of the 
procedure (Step 2 guidelines) are published as a guideline of the Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP, operating within the EMA). These are then, 
and as such, subject to consultation within the EU (the same occurs in the other two 
regions).148  
Since these consultations are carried out according to the procedures and practices 
of the European Medicines Agency, the impact on participation seems to be minimal or 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
JOURNAL OF POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 1, 11-14 (1998). See also http://www.ich.org/about/history.html 
(accessed February 23, 2012).  
145 European Medicines Agency (EMA), “Procedure for European Union Guidelines and Related Documents within 
the Pharmaceutical Legislative Framework”, London, 18 March 2009 Doc.Ref. EMEA/P/24143/2004 REV. 1 corr 
(henceforth “EMA Procedural Guidelines”), 9 (4.1.3). 
146 EMA Procedural Guidelines, 4 and 5 (2.1 and 2.2). 
147 Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 31 March 2004, laying down 
Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and 
establishing a European Medicines Agency (O.J. L 136/1, 30.4.2004), as amended. See also Article 26 of Directive 
2001/83/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 6 November 2001, on the Community code relating 
to medicinal products for human use (O.J. L 311/67, 28.11.2001), as amended. 
148 The formal procedure for the adoption of ICH guidelines is described in http://www.ich.org/about/process-of-
harmonisation/formalproc.html (accessed February 23, 2012). 
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even virtually inexistent. However, in the case of ICH guidelines, the results of the 
consultation are assessed, not by the EMA, but by the ICH expert working group that 
prepared the draft guidelines. The assessment of the comments received, mainly the 
statement of reasons that reflects the reasons to accept and reject the observations of the 
participants is a crucial aspect of participation procedures. In this respect, EMA’s 
practices are certainly more transparent than those of the ICH. In particular, EMA 
prepares a report on its assessment of the comments received and makes this publicly 
available.149 On the contrary, there is little information on how comments are treated 
within the ICH. The ICH website informs us that the expert working group that 
prepared the draft guideline assesses them with a view to achieving consensus. Indeed, 
consensus is the basis of the ICH normative activity, throughout the procedure for the 
approval of guidelines.150 At this stage, the representatives of the industry and of the 
regulatory entities that compose the expert working group may decide that the consensus 
that based the release of the draft guideline should be maintained after the consultation, 
or that modifications should be made. In any event, these need to be agreed by 
consensus.151 Contrary to the practices of the EMA, there seems to be no concern 
regarding the feedback to be given to the participants neither public explanations on the 
regulatory options finally made. As such, the value of the consultation procedure remains 
in the shade. It is hardly possible for interested persons to assess how their contribution 
has impacted on the final decision.  
Inclusiveness is another aspect the approval of ICH guidelines might hinder. The 
EMA purports to involve in its consultation procedures patients, consumers and health 
care professionals, mainly through their respective organizations.152 This concern is not 
matched by the ICH. Even though, as mentioned, the EMA conducts the consultation 
on the ICH guidelines following its usual practices, the voice of parties outside the 
pharmaceutical industry – most likely already quite weak on such highly technical 
matters, however potentially relevant – is likely to fade as the regulatory process moves 
back to the international arena. Irrespective of how successful the EMA’s efforts of 
                                                                
149 EMA Procedural Guidelines (n. 145, above), 17 (4.7).  
150 See link quoted in note 148. 
151 Step 3 of the formal procedure. 
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inclusiveness effectively are, this is a non-negligible effect of the reception of 
international pharmaceutical standards in EU law. 
 
The administration empowers the administration 
Unlike the situations analyzed in the section above, there is not in this case a 
formal international commitment of the EU in carrying out international activities nor is 
implementation of an international regime determined by a EU legislative act. The 
reception of the guidelines of the ICH stems from the participation of the EU – through 
the Commission and the EMA – in the activities of the ICH. ICH itself was established 
on purely informal grounds and was justified by the international needs of harmonization 
determined by the multinational character of the pharmaceutical industry. At the same 
time, the international activity of the EMA is sanctioned in general and somewhat 
imprecise terms in its founding regulation.153 
Arguably, the risks of “outsourcing” decision-making and circumventing internal 
controls are even more pronounced in such cases of international administrative 
collaboration. It is a European agency that incorporates decisions of international bodies 
in EU decision-making procedures, decisions in which elaboration it participates without 
a clear mandate from the EU legislator. In the absence of limiting legal rules, there are 
virtually no limits as to what international harmonization or coherence with international 
standards and best practices requires in the view of the agency. In such circumstances, 
EU decision-making procedures may ultimately become “empty [vessels] for 
international governance writ large”,154 insofar as the acts adopted tend to conform to 
international standards. However, as an effect, EU decision-making procedures become 
also deprived to a greater or lesser extent of the procedural rules that have become 
                                                                
153 According to Article 57 (1) (j) of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 (n. 147 above) one of the EMA’s tasks is to “upon 
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154 Daniel Halberstam and Eric Stein, The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and 
Individual Rights in a Plural World Order, 46 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 13, 62 (2009). 
 33 
accepted in EU law and governance as standards of legitimacy against which to measure 
the exercise of public authority. 
In this case, lower procedural standards may be coupled with shifts in public 
authority. Indeed, the authoritative source that justifies the reception of the decision of 
the international body lies outside the EU legal system and of the formally assumed 
international commitments of the EU. The standards of the ICH are vindicated as best 
practices in international expert fora, in which the Commission and the EMA represent 
the EU. This is their source of authority. They are accepted as best practices by the 
competent EU administrative entities that, therefore, incorporate them in their decisions. 
Cases such as these – as well as reception of international decisions that, even if covered 
by EU legal rules of reception, is based on broad delegation clauses capable of 
encompassing virtually any decision of the EU administration (e.g. international 
standards and best practices must be followed) – might contribute to strengthen the 
weight of the executive and, in limit cases, circumvent the legislator’s discretion in 
shaping the EU’s international obligations. This clashes with the limits of reception 
defined by the Court of Justice, and, as a result, aggravates the legitimacy problems 
stemming from the reception of international decisions that depletes procedural 
standards otherwise applicable by force of EU law. 
5. Preserving procedural standards: an outlook 
This article has shown that the general rules that delimit the conditions under 
which decisions of international organizations or bodies may be received in EU law, as 
defined by the Court of Justice, are limited in two respects. First, they are insufficient to 
preserve procedural rules that have become accepted standards of legitimacy of the 
exercise of public power within the EU. Second, they do not capture the interactions that 
may occur in practice between the EU administration and international regulatory bodies, 
beyond the formal ways through which the EU assumes international commitments – 
either voluntarily or by effect of legally binding international agreements. This 
potentiates the possible negative effects that the incorporation of decisions of 
international organizations or bodies may have on EU procedural standards.  
The general rules of reception ensure respect for procedural rules only insofar as 
international law cannot have the effect of prejudicing the “constitutional guarantees 
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stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system”.155 In procedural terms, 
this translates as preventing reception that may collide with guarantees of due process in 
the restriction of fundamental rights. Important as this undoubtedly is, it does not 
preserve procedural standards – such as participation – that have been developed by the 
EU with a view to secure the legitimacy of its non-legislative rulemaking activities 
beyond the core constitutional values generally identified with liberal conceptions of 
democracy.  
It follows from the analysis above that, at present, beyond the mentioned 
guarantees of due process, what procedural standards apply in cases of reception is a 
matter left to the system where the international decision originates. Therefore, it will be 
regulated in a variety of different ways, which may or may not match in functional terms 
the EU procedural standards otherwise applicable. Ultimately, this leads to a lack of 
consistency between the procedures followed in purely internal decision-making and 
those followed in decision-making that results from the reception of decisions of 
external actors.156 This has more severe consequences in terms of legitimacy when 
regulatory acts adopted at the international level impact significantly on the legal spheres 
of individuals. Lack of consistency will more likely than not be detrimental to procedural 
rules that would otherwise be followed in internal decision-making, as in the case of 
reception of the decisions of Fisheries Commissions. But it may also highlight the 
internal inconsistencies of the EU with regard to its own procedural standards, as in the 
case of reception of the decisions of the CITES CoP. 
The problem identified and analyzed in this article begs a normative solution, 
which may stem from the evolving EU constitutional framework on the legitimation and 
limitation of public authority (the constitutional question), from procedures that could be 
developed by the EU on the basis of Treaty articles (the procedural question), or from 
theoretical conceptions regarding the relationship between autonomous but intersecting 
legal orders in the global scene. These three different paths to preserve procedural 
standards at the intersection between the EU and global regulatory regimes, and their 
respective hurdles, will be outlined next. 
The constitutional question 
                                                                
155 Kadi (n. 28 above), paragraphs 316 and 326 (see also paragraphs 334, 285 and 304). 
156 On the broader significance of consistency, see n. 90 above. 
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Some of the procedural standards that may be depleted as a result of the 
interaction between EU law and global regulatory regimes stem from principles that have 
now explicitly been raised to constitutional principles in the EU Treaties. Since the 
Lisbon revision, the Treaty on European Union includes transparency and participation 
not mediated by a representative assembly as part of the democratic principles on which 
the EU is founded (Articles 10(3) and 11 TEU). By Treaty determination, transparency 
and participation ought to pervade not only the legislative and administrative activities of 
the EU, but also those regulatory activities and institutional practices that shape the EU’s 
“living constitution” outside formalized procedures and that contribute to shaping the 
EU polity.157 Indeed, transparency and participation are ancillary to good governance 
(Article 15(1) TFEU) whichever the locus of governance and irrespective of the level at 
which it takes place. At the same time, promoting “good global governance” is one of 
the objectives of the EU external policy (Article 21(2)(h) TEU). Arguably, the duty of 
consistency between external action and internal policies (Article 21(3) TEU, second 
paragraph) extends also to the way the EU’s policies are put in place, that is, to the 
procedures through which authority is exercised. In this light, one could argue that 
Article 15(1) TFEU and Article 21 (2) (h) TEU are respectively the internal and the 
external dimension of good governance. 
It may be that the Treaties’ current provisions on participation, transparency and 
good governance will widen the debate, triggered by the Kadi case, on how far the Court 
of Justice should expand the limits of their rules of reception.158 However, it is still early 
to predict which normative consequences will follow from these provisions. Despite the 
Treaty’s endorsement of principles that thus far had been to a great extent kept outside 
the purview of traditional constitutional discourse as mere principles of governance, 
Treaty interpreters might hold on to the view that such concepts and principles belong to 
“pragmatic governance” and remain at the margins of core constitutional principles such 
                                                                
157 On the concept of living constitution, Deirdre Curtin THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. LAW, 
PRACTICES, AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, (Oxford University Press, 2009), 11. 
158 There has been much debate on the meaning of the Kadi judgment to the commitment of the EU towards its 
international law obligations (see, e.g., Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after 
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the primacy of that resolution in international law”, see, significantly, Case T-85/09, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v 
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and by the Council - C-593/10 P, O.J. C 72/9, 5.3.2011). 
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as rule of law and democracy.159 In this interpretation, there would be no scope for 
extending the current rules of reception in a way that, still grounded on the protection of 
the EU’s constitutional principles, they would include the preservation of procedural 
standards stemming from the principles of transparency and participation. Courts in 
particular may be conservative in endorsing new views on established constitutional 
principles.  
Nevertheless, one ought not ignore the new facets that the Lisbon Treaty explicitly 
added to these principles.160 In particular, the democratic value of transparency and 
participation are now clearly stated in the Treaty, in Articles 10(3) and 11 TEU, which 
should be read in conjunction with Article 15(1) TFEU. Moreover, procedural standards 
based on transparency and participation also add new dimensions to the rule of law, 
which is also a founding value of the EU. They unveil processes of decision-making, and 
thus, potentially, the relationships therein established between public decision-makers 
and influential private actors. As such, they create the conditions to control the exercise 
of public power, even if to a limited extent. This role of transparency and participation is 
particularly relevant in instances of exercise of authority that escape the traditional 
institutional controls by democratically accountable institutions typical within the state.   
The procedural question 
The EU legal system contains a norm that could contribute to avoiding the 
possible negative effects of the interaction between global regulatory regimes and EU law 
with regard to procedural standards. Article 218(9) TFEU determines that the position of 
the Union to be adopted in decision-making procedures of bodies set up by international 
agreements, when such procedures lead to the adoption of acts with legal effects, shall be 
adopted by the Council, on a proposal of the Commission or of the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and upon information given to the 
                                                                
159 The expression “pragmatic governance” is from Gráinne de Búrca The constitutional challenge of new governance in the 
European Union 28 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW, 814-839, 816 (2003). It should be recalled that the democratic value of 
transparency and participation has long been part of the academic debate on EU democracy (see, e.g., Deirdre Curtin, 
“Civil society” and the European Union: opening spaces for deliberative democracy? in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF 
EUROPEAN LAW, Vol. VII, Book 1 (Kluwer International Law, 1996) 185. 
160 On the relevance of Articles 9 to 12 TEU for the conceptualization of democracy beyond the State, see Armin von 
Bogdandy, “The European Lesson for International democracy. The Significance of Articles 9 to 12 EU Treaty for 
International Organizations” Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/11, available at 
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European Parliament.161 The Commission negotiates then in these fora in accordance 
with the Union’s position established by the Council. In cases where the reception of 
decisions adopted by the international bodies could deplete procedural standards 
otherwise applicable by force of EU law, the EU institutions could attempt to 
compensate this effect by including similar procedural guarantees in the procedure 
leading to the definition of the Union’s position in international negotiations.162 This 
would be consonant with the Treaty provisions on participation, openness and good 
governance, as well as with the requirement of consistency, mentioned above. Indeed, 
the problems pointed out in this essay and the possible breach of procedural standards 
which now have a basis in the Treaty could be an argument to hold that the Council 
ought to use Article 218(9) TFEU also with the purpose of avoiding the negative effects 
to EU procedural guarantees stemming from the reception of international decisions.  
Article 218(9) TFEU applies when the international body where the Union’s 
position will be expressed adopts “acts having legal effects”. The expression is 
ambiguous, as it raises the doubt whether it is applicable only to legally binding acts.163 
However, also formally non-binding acts produce legal effects. The recommendations 
adopted by the CITES CoP, the legal value of which is disputable, are a case in point.164 
Even if one adopts a restrictive interpretation of “acts having legal effects” as referring 
only to legally binding acts, a procedure analogous to the one established by Article 
218(9) TFEU that would respect procedural standards could be set up under the 
responsibility of the Commission, on the basis of its general competence to ensure the 
Union’s external representation under Article 17(1) TEU and in consonance with the 
Treaty provisions mentioned above.165 
Yet, there are obstacles in resorting to Article 218(9) TFEU (and, by extension, to 
Article 17(1) TFEU, as its surrogate) with a view to preserving procedural standards. 
First, the procedure defined in this provision appears to be seldom followed in practice. 
Often the international positions of the Union are established informally between the 
                                                                
161 Article 218(9) and (10) TFEU (see also Rule 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 7th plenary 
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164 See n. 100 above. 
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Commission and the Member States, also in cases where Article 218(9) TFEU should 
apply.166 As the Council itself admitted to the Court, “it is not uncommon for 
Community positions to be established through direct Council approval of the text on 
which the position is to be adopted, without an accompanying sui generis decision”.167 
Second, it would introduce and additional level of formality that may be incompatible 
with the reality of international negotiations, namely with time constraints.168 Be that as it 
may, both factors only highlight possible practical obstacles, which are not sustainable in 
the light of the Treaty. As stressed by the Court of Justice, the fact that the Council has 
often ignored the procedure of Article 218(9) TFEU (former Article 300(2), second 
paragraph of the EC Treaty) is not a valid argument to keep on ignoring it.169 In addition, 
there are limits to the level of flexibility needed in the course of international 
negotiations.170 Arguably, respect for procedural standards such as transparency and 
participation, which have now a basis in the Treaties, ought at least to be balanced 
against such flexibility. 
Even if such obstacles could be overcome, this solution has limitations. First, it 
could bind the EU to the terms of negotiation, as these would be established in the 
Council decision, but not to its outcomes, which in most cases will not depend on the 
Union’s will. In what concerns participation, the consultation of interest representatives 
that could take place during the procedure of Article 218(9) TFEU would be only an 
indirect way of voicing the interests affected by the decisions adopted in international 
fora and then received in EU law. Second, the wording of this provision (“positions to 
be adopted on the Union behalf”) is open enough to include under its scope situations 
such as CITES in which the Union participates in the international decision-making 
procedures through the Member States acting on its behalf, because it is not a party to 
the respective agreement.171 However, it is harder to argue that it applies also to the 
positions defined on behalf of the Union by EU agencies acting in global fora when this 
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the 54th Meeting of the Committee on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, held in Brussels, 22 March 2011, p. 2 (available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/ctwff_en.htm, accessed on February 23, 2012). 
167 Case C-370/07 (n. 109 above), paragraph 35. 
168 On the feasibility of complying with Article 281(9) TFEU, see, further, Kuijper (n. 17 above), 101. See also Joni 
Heliskoski, Case C-370/07, Commission v Council, Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Second Chamber) of 1 October 2009, 
nyr, 48 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 555, 566 (2011). These concerns seem to underlie the arguments of the 
Council in Case C-370/07 (n. 109 above), paragraph 33. 
169 Case C-370/70 (n. 109 above), paragraph 54.  
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happens largely at the margin of the Treaties and of the EU institutions with external 
competence (as in the case of the ICH analyzed). If and when the practices mentioned 
are on the fringes of legality, the argument of analogy just defended would lay on shakier 
ground. 
The theoretical question 
Possible paths to solve the problem addressed in this article may found more 
fertile ground in theoretical analyses on the relationships between autonomous legal 
orders.  How may be such relationships framed normatively with a view to preserving 
procedural standards in the areas of intersection between legal systems? Such an 
approach would, in particular, allow going beyond eurocentric perspectives. This 
criticism may be raised against the constitutional and the procedural paths outlined 
above, which not only address specific European concerns, but also rely unilaterally on 
EU constitutional values and norms. The following observations are only a prelude to 
such a theoretical analysis. 
One may argue that the effects of reception of decisions of international 
organizations or bodies in EU law analyzed in this essay are simply a manifestation of the 
“disorder of normative orders” that increasingly characterizes the global scene,172 or the 
result of the intersystemic relations between differentiated legal orders in which spaces 
for conflict and alternative approaches should be preserved.173 From this perspective, one 
could argue, there is no a priori reason why the Fisheries Commissions should follow 
rules of participation that are functionally similar to those followed in EU law, nor, 
conversely, why the EU when deciding on which specimens should be listed under its 
trade control rules should create opportunities and conditions of participation that 
mirror in functional terms those followed by the CITES CoP when adopting similar 
decisions. Accordingly, one could – should – assess positively the limits of the rules of 
reception that this article identified. In other words, there is nothing more that the EU 
rules that filter the incorporation of decisions of international organizations or bodies 
should impose apart from respect with the core constitutional guarantees. 
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Yet, the problem remains. In such circumstances, the interaction between legal 
systems may very well deplete rules of procedure intended to ensure open and, to the 
extent possible, inclusive procedures subject to the scrutiny of the concerned 
constituencies. The rules of participation trumped by reception in two of the cases 
analyzed – fisheries and medicines – structure the exercise of public authority. They were 
established to ensure due consideration for different competing interests involved in 
decision-making and, thereby, not only an accurate factual basis of decision but also 
improved conditions of compliance due to a better understanding of the decisions taken. 
These are both conditions for achieving – or, at least, facilitating the achievement – of 
the substantive goals underlying each of the policies in these cases. 
It may be argued that this is a purely internal problem of the EU. Furthermore, if 
the EU were to condition the reception of decisions of international organizations or 
bodies depending on whether or not they abide to procedural standards functionally 
equivalent to those valid within it, this would disrupt the very processes of international 
decision-making to an unacceptable degree. This is a valid argument. Yet, at whichever 
level it is exercised, “public power stands in need of legitimation and limitation”174 and, 
also in the global scene, political processes have been relying more frequently on setting 
rules for decision-making that structure and limit the exercise of public authority. 
International organizations and global regulatory bodies have sought to submit their 
actions to self-created standards that, at least (possibly at best, in some cases), create the 
appearance that they do not pursue their own interests irrespective of the public interests 
they proclaim (e.g. food safety, environmental protection, market or trade regulation).175 
This is illustrated, in different ways, by the three cases analyzed in this article. Such 
procedures tend to include some degree of participation.176 Together with transparency 
and the giving of reasons, increasing demands of participation are perceptible, in 
different variants, in some global regulatory regimes.177 In the words of one 
commentator, “they are something you find sometimes, within some institutions (or 
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regulatory systems), and not other times, or within other institutions (or regulatory 
systems)”.178 They ultimately stem from the empirical observation and normative claim 
that state consent is not capable of sustaining the legitimation of international 
institutions, as they become sites of public authority that can no longer be pinned down 
to the will of states.179 
In general terms and without further ado, one cannot claim that transparency, in 
the broad sense of providing access to information also on how decisions are reached, 
and participation beyond representation are political-legal values common to the EU and 
to global regulatory regimes, nor that they can be universally perceived as forms of 
bridging democratic shortcomings or as instruments that may facilitate the control of 
public authority. Not only global regulatory regimes are extremely varied, but also within 
the EU – as the CITES case demonstrated – such values are not followed consistently. 
Furthermore, even if empirical research would allow us to identify commonly accepted 
procedural standards of legitimate governance, the rationale and effects of rules of 
transparency and participation are likely to be quite diverse across policy fields and across 
levels of governance, and lead to diverse degrees of involvement of the constituencies 
concerned.180  
Nevertheless, the fact that transparency and participation are increasingly 
enshrined in rulemaking procedures followed in the global setting indicates that the 
depletion of procedural standards inspired by such values may be a problem of 
legitimacy that is not uniquely a concern of the EU. What at first sight would seem to be 
purely an internal problem may indeed be common to the global regulatory regimes that 
intersect with the EU legal system. Many face legitimacy problems parallel to those that 
led the EU to seek for forms of “democratic supplementation” that have now made their 
way into the Treaties.181 
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If ensuring procedural standards may be a concern shared by the EU and global 
regulatory systems, even if in varying degrees, the question follows: how can procedural 
divergences between interlocking legal systems be coordinated, as to preserve the 
procedural standards involved? A first difficulty lies in establishing whether a common 
understanding on values that ground procedural standards can be shared by overlapping 
legal systems. On which basis could conflicting legal systems operating at the global level 
agree on common legal yardsticks to assess the validity of their respective procedural 
rules? The need for such yardsticks is implicit in the very formulation of the problem – 
the preservation of procedural standards at the intersection of legal systems – and, yet, 
they are not readily available in the global setting as meta-norms that would be 
recognized and accepted by different jurisdictions.  
One starting point to approach this hurdle would be to defend that the 
relationships between interlocking legal systems are content-dependent. Legal systems 
that receive decisions and rules adopted within other legal systems relegate such 
decisions and rules to an external authority. The contention that these relationships are 
content-dependent would stem from the assumption that, in doing so, receiving legal 
systems do not renounce their normative commitments, as exemplified by the Solange-
type of interaction between national constitutional courts of the EU Member States and 
the European Court of Justice.182 On this basis, one could seek to establish whether   
common political-legal values are shared by the interlocking legal systems and whether 
transparency and participation could be part of such “terms of engagement”.183  
Accepting diverging ways of giving meaning to such values would lay the ground for 
normative processes of recognition and revision through which one could potentially 
arrive at preserving procedural standards. 
In sum, the acknowledgement of similar problems of procedural legitimacy shared 
by the EU and the global regulatory systems with which it interacts, and the assumption 
that the relationships between these legal systems is content-dependent could potentially 
leave little room to justify without further ado the depletion of procedural standards as a 
result of systems’ interaction. 
                                                                
182 On content-dependent deference, see Gianluigi Palombella, The rule of law beyond the state: Failures, promises, and theory, 
7 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 442 (2009), in particular, 458-461, 463. 
183 The expression is taken from Kumm (n. 139 above), 928. 
